Background

Frankfurt writes Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person in The Journal of Philosophy, 1971. He writes this text in an effort to clarify the concept of the person as defined prominently by P.F. Strawson (Individuals, 1959) and A.J. Ayer, The Concept of a Person, 1963). That is, he writes to distinguish a person from a non-person (e.g. an animal).

An Explanation of Frankfurt’s Argument

This distinction of personhood is necessary, per Frankfurt, because the standard view of personhood is an entity such that both consciousness and physical attributes are equally attributable to the person. However, Frankfurt finds this problematic, as such a conception includes some animals. Frankfurt does not think animals ought to hold personhood status. As such, Frankfurt endeavours to clarify a definition of personhood. He argues the key differentiator between persons and other creatures is found in the structure of a person’s will. Many animals have the capacity for ‘first-order desires.’ However, only Man has the capacity for reflective self-evaluation manifested in second-order desires.

What is a Second order Desire?

“Someone has a desire of the secord order when he wants simply to have a certain desire or when he wants a certain desire to be his will” (10). It is this second order desire that is essential for personhood. It is the freedom to will what one wants. By contrast, the first order desire is only to do what one desires (i.e. freedom of action).

Furthermore, a person is capable of deliberating amongst different wills. They are able to determine what is the most valuable. Furthermore, some individuals can be prone to self-deceit, or other second-order conflicts. In this manner, there can be a danger of having no second order desires.

My Reflections on Frankfurt

There’s a couple of criticisms I have.

First, I disagree with the reductive nature of Frankfurt’s argument. Surely even the most mentally challenged child would be considered a person and not a ‘wanton’ as Frankfurt’s argument suggests. Frankfurt’s focus on desire of the will and volitions, though, means his escape routes from this problem are limited.

Second, I have a criticism on the lack of a mind/body distinction. Frankfurt is solely focused on the mind as being the distinguishing feature within the person. This agrees with modern performativist notions of personhood. However, such an argument is narrow. Frankfurt throws away the material corporeality utilised by Strawson and Ayer. This is problematic because it suggests there is only a single critical feature of personhood. In fact, by not considering corporeality in his argument Frankfurst in unable to provide an adequate conception of personhood.

Conclusion

Frankfurt writes in Freedom of the Will and the Concept of the Person that a person ought to be defined by having a second order of desire - an ability to will something for oneself - in addition to a first order of desire - the ability to act. The argument is enlightening with regard to philosophy of mind. However, as I argue, personhood defined only by the mind and with the exclusion of other facets like corporeality is a narrow definition. Frankfurt ought to at minimum acknowledge such limits in his arguments.