Background

Karina Vold writes in ‘The Parity Argument for Extended Consciousness’ that Andy Clark and David Charlmer’s extended mind thesis can be supported to also include consciousness. The extended mind thesis says that ‘certain mental states and processes can be partially constituted by objects located beyond one’s brain and body’ (pg.1, Vold, 2015). Vold argues that maintaining such an argument while denying extended consciousness does not hold given technological advances and phenomenological rationale. I argue against this.

An Explanation of Vold’s Points

Vold’s argument can be said in the following manner.

Vold begins by noting C7C’s argument (p.26):

(P1) What makes some object count as constitutive of a mental state is the role it plays
(P2) An object beyond an agent’s biological body can play the same role as an object that surely constitutes an ordinary mental state
(c) Therefore, an object in an agent’s environment can count as partially constitutive of an agent’s conscious mental state.

Vold then suggests that C&C could add ‘conciscousness’ to their extended mind thesis and it would still hold. Vold notes this stands in contrast to C&C who argue consciousness cannot be extended because extra-neural bandwidth is not sufficient (Chalmers 2008, p.6).

I agree with Vold’s arguments against C&C. The speed of transmission should not affect whether consciousness can be extended. However, as I note below, I disagree with the notion of consciousness itself being extendable outside of a body. Vold’s argument incorrectly presumes this is possible.

My Counterargument

My criticism against Vold’s argument is that consciousness itself is a confusing term. But that aside, I find the argument falls flat on the fact that consciousness is particular to the mind-body connection. It is possible that the mind itself can be extended. Such an activity is a natural combination given both AI minds and human minds work in a ‘hyper-rationalist’ method.

However, I am doubtful that the same might be said of consciousness. For consciousness is not simply a combination of neurons in the sense of the mind. Rather, consciousness is connected to who we are as persons. Consider for example Parfit’s argument that if a brain was transplanted into another person then the person would have new personhood. That is, the person would have a new identity. In this manner, the extension of consciousness would not be possible.

Second, I argue that a substance-based account of personhood would aptly deny the possibility of an extended conscious mind.

Conclusion

Karina Vold writes in ‘The Parity Argument for Extended Consciousness’ that Andy Clark and David Charlmer’s extended mind thesis can be supported to also include consciousness. The extended mind thesis says that ‘certain mental states and processes can be partially constituted by objects located beyond one’s brain and body’ (pg.1, Vold, 2015). Vold argues that maintaining such an argument while denying extended consciousness does not hold given technological advances and phenomenological rationale. I argued against this.